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Abstract: <<supply brief abstract (less than 100 words)>>

When communism collapsed in Central and Eastern Europe, beginning with the
fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the Velvet Revolution in Prague a
month later, it was apparent that some very significant changes would need to be
made as the transition to market democracy proceeded. The public sector of the
centrally planned economy suffered from excessive centralization, and some form
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of fiscal decentralization would be required. Tanzi (1991) and Litvak et al. (1998)
perceive fiscal decentralization as necessary to overcome the centralization of the
communist era and ensure the efficiency of public services. On the basis of public
finance principles established by Tiebout (1956) and Bish and Kirk (1974), Oates
(1998) sees decentralization as the key to bringing transparency and accountability to public action in the formerly communist regimes and to securing citizens’
participation in their own public affairs.
When we began in the mid-1990s to investigate Czech efforts to transform their
system, we encountered varying perceptions among public officials of the degree
to which political and economic autonomy should be transferred from the center
to subnational governments, as well as varying perceptions as to how well that
task actually was being accomplished. We also found that transfers of funds from
the center to the municipalities represented a large share of the total revenues of
local budgets, that little fiscal effort was being exerted at the local level, and that
the generation of own-revenue funds at the local level was modest. The Czechs
seemed in no hurry to achieve genuine local fiscal autonomy.
We researched the views of the finance ministry and, with the ministry’s assistance, questioned local officials about their views. Understanding some of the
differences in perspectives, we felt we were not getting the full picture of local
officials’ positions on fiscal issues. We wanted to know how people most directly
affected by decentralization efforts—or the lack thereof—perceived intergovernmental relations in the Czech Republic. Were centralist tendencies still a problem?
Had local officials been able to adapt their budgetary decision and spending practices
to whatever fiscal decentralization had already occurred?
Kamenic=ková (1996), a strong spokesperson for the finance ministry, writes
of a “discord” in local budgets between the municipality’s significant authority
on the expense side and its very limited authority on the income side. We came
to agree that Czech local authorities basically have no power to affect their own
budget revenues, but we did not observe the considerable expenditure side authority which Kamenic=ková had described. Czech subnational governments have no
significant independent revenue sources; their budgets essentially consist of transfers
and grants from the central government. Transferred funds generally came with
central government’s mandated expenditures. We came to believe that centralist
traditions were becoming legacies to which the transition era was accommodating
itself. We desired, however, to know how local officials perceived their situation
and concluded that we needed a survey to reveal perceptions of intergovernmental
fiscal relations and attitudes toward problems of local finance.
The Research Design
Instrument Development and Data Collection
Over time, we developed a series of questions regarding practices and perceptions
in intergovernmental relations. These gradually became a questionnaire for local
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officials. It was developed in cooperation with officials of The Union of Towns
and Municipalities of the Czech Republic (Svaz me=st a obcí C+eské republiky, or
SMO). As the questionnaire took form, the SMO offered input during the multiple
pretests that were used to fine-tune the questionnaire. The questionnaire was targeted
at local officials, mayors, and professional administrators, and was designed to
identify local perceptions and preferences of autonomy as well as actual practices.
The questionnaire was administered online in Czech through Qualtrics.com. By
the cutoff date—January 15, 2006—a total of 456 Czech municipal officials, most
of whom were elected mayors, had completed the questionnaire.
Although there is always a concern about how respondents differ from nonrespondents, the response rate was substantial. The high return rate may be a result
of the publicity received through the office of the SMO, the personalized handling
of the outgoing invitation, the American university affiliation with the project, or
significant respondent interest in the topic.
Hypotheses
The existing literature provides little insight into any configurable differences
between municipalities having self-reported lower or higher autonomy in their
activities. Thus, in developing hypotheses about the variables that influence local
perceptions of autonomy, there were few hints from the literature. We had some
ideas about attitudes derived from our interaction with Czech central government
officials and from limited interviews with Czech municipal officers. From these
interactions, it seems clear that one key to understanding municipality governance
and autonomy is to understand the experiences and spending patterns of the municipalities involved. Next, given the identification of high- and low-autonomy
municipalities, and given the insights thus generated and discussed in the introduction, the following hypotheses were formulated:
H1: High- and low-autonomy municipality groups are each composed of multiple
segments, the members of which differ in their use of financial expenditure types
and funding sources.
H2: Town and city municipality groups differ in their use of financial funding by
type of municipal expenditures and funding source.

Fiscal Differences in Towns and Administrative Cities of the
Czech Republic
The Czech Republic is a country of many small municipalities and villages, which
is the primary reason the Czech central government gives for heavy central involvement in municipal finance. Very small towns lack the human and other resources
required to manage an autonomous budget process. To investigate this central
involvement, we tested perceived autonomy (H1) and municipality size (H2) as
indicators of autonomy. We used a five-dimensional autonomy measure to examine
self-reported autonomy levels by municipality size.
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Autonomy Measure
This multidimensional construct measuring financial autonomy is the sum of five
independent measures, each scaled on a five-point agreement scale:

A = I + D + M + C + R,
where A is autonomy; I is investments, meaning the ability to make capital investments in local facilities; D is debt, meaning the ability to meet debt obligations;
M is fund management discretion, the ability independently to manage and transfer
funds from various sources to cover cost increases and overruns; C is local control,
the ability to use local discretion to pool and allocate funds to various projects; and
R is local revenue, the percentage of total revenue generated locally.
We next analyzed the autonomy segments with respect to expenditures to derive
an understanding of perceived autonomy, funding sources, and expenditure patterns for general categories of services. This analysis did not support H1, meaning
that expenditure types differed across autonomy segments. After further reflection, we realized that this should not have been unexpected. The relation between
funding sources and expenditure types would be more likely to differ by city size
than by self-reported perceptions of the prevailing fiscal situation. The analysis of
municipality autonomy scores by the size of the municipality shows differences in
the expected direction, with larger cities having higher autonomy scores than the
towns (F = 4.242, probability = 0.006).
Municipal Size Measure
A more concrete measure of the difference in autonomy patterns is the actual differences in expenditures that might exist in larger cities and smaller towns. Based
on a distribution of respondents’ municipal size, we divided municipalities into the
categories of either town or administrative city, with the former including all municipalities up to 1,999 inhabitants (74 percent of the total) and the administrative
city designation including those of 2,000 or more inhabitants. Cities are generally
thought of as being endowed with far more inhabitants than this, but in terms of
administrative autonomy, two thousand citizens constitute a logical size in terms
of the possibility administrative independence: Cities of this size would generally
have both professional administration and work forces.
Given the town and administrative city (hereafter simply city) groups, we measured budget expenditures by asking local officials to report the sources of their
expenditures for the various programs that represented the important components
of local budgets. They did not report on the precise amounts of their monetary
expenditures, but only whether they had financed their programs with funds from
central government subsidies, shared taxes transferred from the central government,
their own revenues (primarily property tax, local fees and taxes, and property sales),
or deficit expenditures. We were more interested in determining what the size of
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the municipalities implied about their expenditure patterns, rather than an absolute
monetary amount that would be correlated with population size.
Analysis of Budget Expenditures and Funding Sources
We commenced analysis with an evaluation of city size by types of expenditures
funded from different sources. Table 1 reviews of the spending of towns and cities
for various projects and activities, including elementary school education, health
care, sport and culture, general government administration, public transportation,
and police protection. This is more than an adequate sampling of municipalities’
expenditures from four main funding sources: central government subsidies, shared
taxes, own revenues, and municipal debt.
Table 1 identifies statistically significant differences between towns and cities that
derive funds for their expenditures from different sources. Significant differences
exist in the proportions of towns and cities that derive funds for different projects
and activities from the four revenue sources tested. Such differences were found
for expenditures on education (grades 1 through 6), health care, sports and culture,
general government administration, public transportation, and police protection.
Cross tabulations of city size by revenue sources were conducted for various
expenditures (for the activities reported). For all the numerous expenditures listed
in Table 1, regardless of the sources of funding for such expenditures, statistically
significant differences were observed, indicating that the use of funds by the respondents differed according to city size.
We now graphically analyze the link in the relation between expenditures and
revenue sources to add insight and intuition to the statistical analysis already undertaken. Radar charts are employed as a visual tool, one for each kind of revenue
source that survey respondents used to report financing of municipal expenses or
public service activities. Three such charts address the revenue sources of small
versus large cities and three address the revenue sources of low- versus highautonomy cities. The spokes of the radar tables in Figure 1 show the expenditure
types being reported. The circular links between those spokes show the percentage
of respondents reporting the use of the funding type identified in the chart title.
Figure 1a shows how town and city groups use central government subsidies for the
first expenditure type, education for grades 1 through 6, which is the vertical spoke
on the table. The data sheet from which the tables were constructed indicates that
112 municipalities from towns and 19 from cities report having received central
government subsidies to finance education projects and activities. On that education
spoke, then, 40.0 percent of those reporting the use of subsidies were from towns
(the thick line) and 19.9 percent from cities (the thin line).
From the same table, consider the second spoke representing expenditures for
health care. Here a total of 20 respondents from towns and 18 from cities received
central government subsidies. From that spoke, we see that those reporting the use
of subsidies included 7.1 percent of all towns (the thick line) and 18.2 percent of
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Education, grades 1–6
Receiving subsidies
   Percent
Shared taxes
   Percent
Used own revenues
   Percent
Health care
Receiving subsidies
   Percent receiving
Shared taxes
   Percent receiving
Used own revenues
   Percent
Social care
Receiving subsidies
   Percent receiving
Shared taxes
   Percent receiving
Used own revenues
   Percent
General government administration
Receiving subsidies
   Percent receiving
80
80.80
80
80.80
58
58.60
18
18.20
34
34.30
36
36.40
63
63.60
58
58.60
49
49.50
69
69.70

20
7.10
64
22.90
60
21.40
69
24.60
92
32.90
85
30.40
151
53.90

Cities

168
60.00
172
61.40
129
46.10

Towns

Table 1. Reported Source of Municipal Funding by City Size

220
58.00

132
34.80
150
39.60
134
35.40

38
10.00
98
25.90
96
25.30

248
65.40
252
66.50
187
49.30

Total

0.001***

11.72

0.006**

0.000**

20.25

7.47

0.000***

0.003**

8.63

48.99

0.025*

5.03

0.032*

4.58

0.002**

0.000***

12.33

9.88

0.000***

Probability

14.00

c2
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81
81.80
60
60.60
22
22.20
45
45.50
44
44.40
11
11.10
46
46.50
43
43.40

200
71.40
143
51.10
124
44.30
79
28.20
90
32.10
12
4.30
12
4.30
13
4.60

23
6.10
58
15.30
58
14.80

134
35.40

124
32.70

146
38.50

281
74.10
203
53.60

0.000***
0.000***

87.4

0.014*

0.028*

0.002**

100.4

5.98

4.84

9.88

0.000***

0.1

2.67

15.03

0.042*

4.12

Notes: Analyses showed that any difference between the expenditure type pattern of the towns and cities for communication, fire protection,
garbage, water and sewage, other public works, government wages, and salaries were statistically insignificant. For each category, the number
of reporting towns is 280. The number of cities is 99, for a total of 379. For each expenditure type, the table originally included the number of
municipalities not using debt. The category was dropped because we found that the percentage not using debt was usually in the high nineties.
However, for sport and culture, the percentage of large cities not using debt was only about 92 percent. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

Shared taxes
   Percent receiving
Used own revenues
   Percent
Roads and streets
Receiving subsidies
   Percent receiving
Public transportation
Used own revenues
   Percent
Fire protection
Receiving subsidies
   Percent receiving
Police protection
Receiving subsidies
   Percent
Shared taxes
   Percent
Used own revenues
   Percent
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a. % Receiving Subsidies

b. % Shared Taxes

c. % Own Revenues
Figure 1. Revenue Source and Expenditure Type by Municipality Size
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cities (the thin line). This process of comparing town and city responses continues
around the wheel for all the expenditure categories considered. Connected thin line
points form a perspective of the shares of city respondents, whereas thick lines
join for a perspective of town respondents, reporting subsidy use for each of the
expenditure categories.1
Final Consideration of the Link between Revenue Sources and
Expenditures
Clearly, the types of municipal expenditure differ by municipality segments. There
is a statistically significant difference between relatively smaller and larger cities,
supporting H2. However, as per H1, for low and high perceived autonomy groups,
there is no statistically significant difference in type of expenditures, whether
funded by central government subsidies, shared taxes, own revenues, or debt. In
short, H1 is not supported.
Figures 2a through 2c employ the same arrangement for reporting the shares
of subsidy recipients from the respondents grouped in low- and high-autonomy
segments. These charts are presented for the sake of completeness; as is previously stated, expenditures did not vary by autonomy groups for any of the three
funding sources.
Conclusions
Given the hypothesized relationships above, we conducted an evaluation of city
size by municipal expenditures of diverse types as financed by different funding
sources. Cross tabulations of city size were conducted to identify the revenue sources
for the various types of expenditures and activities reported. For all the numerous
expenditures, regardless of their funding sources, statistically significant differences
were observed, indicating that fund use is more effectively explained by city size
than by the fiscal choices of the high- and low-autonomy groups.
We then developed a graphic analysis of the relation between expenditures and
revenue sources to complement the statistical analysis. Radar charts were employed
for each kind of revenue source reportedly used for the funding of various municipal
public services. Three such charts addressed the revenue sources of small versus
large cities and three addressed the revenue sources of low- versus high-autonomy
cities. Recipients of central government subsidies to fund their main activities,
whether from small towns or larger cities, tended to show similar patterns. Larger
cities were the larger share of municipalities that received subsidies. For most
spending categories, 65 to 70 percent of those reporting the receipt of subsidies
were from small cities. About a third of the large cities reported having received
subsidies, but an even greater share, around 50 percent, reported the receipt of
subsidies for payroll, health care, public works, police protection, and social care.
Around 65 percent of the towns received subsidies, but the share receiving them
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a. % Receiving Subsidies

b. % Shared Taxes

c. % Own Revenues
Figure 2. Source of Municipal Funding by Autonomy Groups
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for roads and streets, as well as for public transportation, actually extended to 80
percent and above.
The use of debt—basically bank credits or municipal bonds—represents an
interesting and fairly complex case. Very few municipalities have resorted to
debt except the larger cities, far larger than the 2,000-plus inhabitants of our city
category. Few smaller cities and towns have done much with deficit financing; the
cities reporting either some debt use or no debt use still sum to 100 percent, but
the absolute number of cities and towns using those instruments has been small.
For the thirteen categories of spending reviewed here, only about 200 cities and
towns reported having used credits. The towns reported a larger share of debt use
in only five types of expenditures; for the remaining eight categories, the larger
cities represented the larger share of the cases resorting to credits. Interestingly, 100
percent of the respondents reporting municipal debt use for general government
administration were from large cities.
Our results link town and city size directly to expenditures and funding. City
size is graphically shown by the radar tables above to affect spending patterns:
The cities form thin line circular patterns uniformly outside the smaller thick line
patterns. Cities uniformly have more funds, whether from subsidies, shared taxes,
or own revenues, for various public services and activities than do the smaller
towns. In the final analysis, the size of the municipalities, which influences the
expenditure needs and the likelihood of being able to attract funding to meet those
needs, will have a greater effect on expenditures than the attitudes of the officials
from differing autonomy segments.
Notes
1. As in the case of communication and education expenditures by central government
subsidy, the shares of town and city respondents using a particular revenue source for a given
public service activity will sum to 100 percent by considering the percentage of respondents
not using this type of funding. The reader receives an indication of the absolute number of
respondents only by estimating the complement to the number using the funding source to
determine if use was very small, very large, or somewhere between.
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